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The present equity research report serves the purpose of executing a valuation 
of Uber Technologies, Inc, an American multinational 
company that provides peer-to-peer ridesharing, food 
delivery, freight services, and bicycle and scooter sharing 
systems in more than 700 cities in 63 countries. 
The valuation performed has in mind the optimistic factors about the company’s 
future (scale, dominance, profitability, and a favorable 
environment to revenue growth) but also the risks it may 
have to face (ATG as a risky segment, regulatory 
restrictions, and ease of raising debt). 
The price target achieved through a DCF valuation is $38.47, 29% above the 
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Executive Summary 
Uber started as a ride-sharing app in 2010, and it is now drawing its path to 
becoming a super-app. Nowadays, it offer services related with ride-sharing 
services, food delivery, freight services, bike and scooter ride-sharing, and 
an embryonic segment of payment services. It operates in 63 countries and 
has generated $ 11,270 million in revenue for 2018. 
The company is a leader in most of the markets where it operates. In the 
markets where Uber finds obstacles to penetrate, it acquires leading 
companies to absorb their share of the market.  
The company’s revenue has been growing over the years, but Uber was not 
able to achieve profitability yet. The big opportunities for the company to 
grow in the future years are in the most recent segments and the increase of 
its penetration rate. 
Uber’s market has low switching costs, which leads to challenges concerning 
consumer’s loyalty, and also low barriers to enter. 
In terms of scale, Uber has an advantage when compared to its peers. There 
is not any company offering the same services in such diversified 
geographies as Uber. However, the competition is more local than global. 
Following the forecast of value drivers, a DCF and Multiple Valuation is 
performed, resulting in different prices. As so, a target price of $38.47 is 
achieved based on DCF, resulting in a buy recommendation. 
Company Overview 
By March 2009, Uber was not more than a mobile app that allowed users to 
get a ride by a simple touch. Nowadays, it is an American multinational 
company that provides services related to peer-to-peer ridesharing, food 
delivery, freight services, and bicycle and scooter sharing systems in more 
than 700 cities in 63 countries. Uber is expected to launch new segments 
over the future years, in its path to becoming a super-app. The company 
went public in May 2019, and on the first day trading, Uber’s stock fell almost 
8%, and as of today, it keeps trading 32% below its issue price of $45.  
In 2016, Ridesharing accounted for 92% of total revenue. In 2018, the same 
segment accounted for 84% of total revenue, with Uber Eats representing 
13% and Uber Freight and New Mobility 3%. Uber is all over the world, from 
North America to Australia, but its position in each geography has been 
changing over the years. In 2018, 52% of Total Gross Bookings were 
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in 2018, 24% of Uber’s Ridesharing Gross Bookings were derived from five 
metropolitan areas: Los Angeles, New York City, San Francisco Bay, London 
and São Paulo. 
Ridesharing 
In the ridesharing sector, Uber is the intermediary between drivers and the 
end-users of the app, which are both seen as clients of the company. Uber 
charges a dynamic price per mile (based on the demand of rides) to each 
rider and then pays drivers a fixed fee based on the miles travelled.  
In the context of this segment, the company has several offerings: Uber for 
Business (U4B), Uber Auto, and the standard ridesharing offers. 
Uber for business is a segment that offers 4 different services: 
• Uber Health, that allows healthcare services providers to schedule 
rides for its patients so they don’t miss any medical appointment; 
• Uber Business Travel, that gives companies a tool to manage their 
employees or clients rides; 
• Uber Vouchers, which sells trips vouchers to companies, so they can 
give it to employees and/or clients to pay for the travel costs; 
• Uber Courtesy, which allows to book rides whenever we have some 
guest visiting the company and in need of a ride. 
Uber Auto is another service of Uber, which is a very typical offer that 
consists of simple ridesharing, but instead of using standard cars, the 
vehicles are auto rickshaws. This type of rides are available in countries 
where these vehicles are particularly famous, mostly in Asia. 
Back in the days, Uber used to extract revenues from leasing contracts 
related to the vehicles used for ridesharing. Today, this offering can be 
considered as irrelevant for the company’s business, since it only accounts 
for 1% of the total revenue. 
Also, in the ridesharing segment, Uber has some self-driving vehicles on 
tests in several cities in the United States (US). However, it has been tough 
for the company to improve these new technologies. In 2018, an Uber self-
driving car killed a woman in the US, which led to an investigation that ended 
with Uber being unblemished. Nevertheless, this led to a bad reputation. 
There is an evident uncertainty about the future performance and success of 
this service because there are many issues involved, from regulation to 
technologies, and there are also competitors who may be one step forward 
of Uber. 
  






Page 5 of 28 
 
New Mobility 
New mobility is a segment of the company that includes dockless e-bikes 
and scooters, offering its services in approximately 30 cities in Europe, the 
US, Canada, and Mexico.  
In what concerns to this segment, Uber purchases the bikes and scooters, 
and it is responsible for its maintenance. Consumers pay for each minute 
using the bike or scooter.  
Uber Eats 
Uber Eats is the food delivery segment of Uber, where it plays the role of 
intermediary between restaurants and end-consumers. The company gets a 
fixed percentage of the restaurant food basket value (around 20%) and also 
charges a delivery fee to the end-consumer, from which it has to pay the 
driver fees. In most countries, this delivery fee is a fixed amount for end-
users ($ 4.99 in the US, for example), but Uber is already testing dynamic 
fees. Although Uber charges a fixed delivery fee to end-users, the company 
pays a dynamic fee to drivers. Uber Eats has recently started a new type of 
business in which Uber is just the platform where the end-users order the 
food, and the drivers are employees of the restaurant. In this way, Uber just 
receives a fixed percentage of the order value. Also, this may be a way for 
Uber to avoid regulatory issues concerning its drivers. 
Uber Freight 
In 2017, Uber launched Uber Freight, a platform that connects trucking 
companies and respective drivers directly with shippers, without a formal 
long-term agreement. Nowadays, they operate in the US, Canada, Poland, 
Germany, and the Netherlands. In this segment, Uber found a very 
fragmented and inefficient market. Companies would take hours or even 
days to find a carrier. Uber Freight has applied the ridesharing rationale to 
this market: connects shippers to the adequate transporters by a simple click. 
As in the ridesharing segment, the company connects the two parts between 
them, establishes the price for shippers, and the reward for carriers and gets 
a percentage of each shipment.  
Acquisitions and Partnerships 
One of Uber’s main future strategies to achieve growth is increasing 
ridesharing penetration in existing markets. 
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There are some markets where Uber found some obstacles to enter. To 
overtake this, the company celebrates partnerships with strategic companies 
and acquires other companies, to absorb their businesses or acquire 
knowledge. 
One of the examples is Careem, which is 100% owned by Uber. This 
company offers ridesharing services, food delivery, and payment services in 
the Middle East. Uber’s acquisition of Careem was the way Uber finds to 
penetrate this market since people are very connected to companies and 
brands of their own country. The company can also take lessons on how to 
diversify its offers from this company, applying it to other geographies. Uber 
has also merged with Yandex in Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Georgia, and Kazakhstan for the same reason. 
In the new mobility sector, Uber is trying to acquire knowledge from other 
specialized companies. The company established a partnership with Jump 
in 2018, which end up with the acquisition of the company itself for about 
$250 million. Uber is also partnering with Lime, another provider of scooters 
around the world, integrating their scooters into Uber’s main app and adding 
its brand to the vehicles. Following the strategy performed on Jump’s 
acquisition, this partnership may end up with an acquisition of Lime, which 
would allow Uber to absorb 28 million miles traveled per year in more than 
100 cities all over the world,  a considerable portion of the scooter’s market1.  
Uber also acquired a majority stake in Cornershop, an online grocery market 
start-up. This Company is a very active demander on the South-American 
market in countries like Chile, Mexico, or Peru, and Uber’s purpose on this 
acquisition was the increase of penetration rate in these markets. The 
acquisiton is expected to be completed in the beginning of 2020, so the 
specific terms of the transaction have not been disclosed. However, Uber 
announced that the management team of Cornershop will be the same, 
responding to a board of Uber members. Having this, in its expansion to the 
US, Cornershop may be incorporated in Uber application or continue to 
operate with their own brand. 
  
 
1 Financial Times. 2019. “Uber Enters Scooter Wars with Lime Investment | 
Financial Times.” Accessed January 1, 2020. 
https://www.ft.com/content/f247dec6-838f-11e8-96dd-fa565ec55929. 
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Financial Performance 
In 2018, Uber generated $ 11,270 million of revenue. Uber’s revenue has 
been increasing over the years, however, at a slower pace year over year. 
Total revenue grew by 106% in 2017, 42% in 2018, and 35% in 2019. This 
slower pace is easy to understand because, at the beginning of each 
segment, Uber has a considerable margin of geographical expansion, which 
led to growth rates of 500%-600% in the first years of each offer.  
In 2017, Uber Eats revenue grew by almost 500%, followed by a 149% 
increase in 2018 and 75% in 2019. For the new mobility and Uber Freight 
together, we have around 500% revenue growth for 2018 and 2019. 
Nevertheless, Uber’s potential to grow on ridesharing and Uber Eats is now 
in the increase of its penetration rate. Also, the younger generations are 
getting more familiarised with this type of service, and it is expected that the 
willing to own a private car decreases, increasing the demand for ridesharing 
or new mobility offers at the same time. People using e-commerce offers are 
increasing and this will become part of everyone’s life in the future. 
Besides the revenue growth, revenue as a percentage of gross bookings 
also increased from 2016 to 2017, reaching 23%. This growth means the 
company is becoming more efficient, improving its cost structure in each 
segment. 
One of the main characteristics of the markets where Uber operates is that 
they have an elastic demand and low switching costs, which leads to low 
pricing power. Most of the people have more than one application installed 
on its smartphone, comparing prices every time it wants to use it. Because 
of that, Uber is not able to increase loyalty among its users, despite the 
company being already dealing with this problem by creating subscription 
plans, that allow people to pay a certain price per month, having zero delivery 
fee on Uber Eats and discounts in the other offers, for example. 
We also have to analyse attractiveness and loyalty in terms of drivers. Uber 
has to retain and attract drivers to their platform, and there are several 
attractive points to have in mind:  
• higher commissions; 
• drivers support; 







































Revenue as % of Gross 
Bookings
Figure 3 - Ridesharing and revenue 
growth by segment 
  






Page 8 of 28 
 
In what concerns to commissions, Uber takes between 25% and 35% for 
each fare. Lyft, for example, takes between 30% and 38%2. Talking about 
drivers' support, the company is investing in having more physical support 
offices, making support faster and more personalized. Take rate and network 
is one of the main advantages of Uber, which leads to more trips and, 
consequently, higher earnings for drivers. If we compare Uber with Lyft in 
these terms, Uber has more rides per driver and more riders per driver. This 
proves that Uber has a strong network that can effectively generate driver 
earnings. 
If we analyse Uber’s competitive position geographically, we can see that 
Uber is a significant player in most of the markets where it operates. In the 
ridesharing market, the company controls more than 65% of the market in 
North America, Latin America, Europe, Australia, and New Zealand. In India, 
Middle Eats, and North Africa, Uber controls more than 50% of the market3.  
One of the main issues for Uber is to become profitable, which it has not 
been until now. Uber’s operating margin has been improving over the years 
but remains negative as of 2018, with a value of -23.5%. However, this could 
be worse if it was not a characteristic of the segment. If these companies will 
ever attain profitability, the key is to be dominant and have a grand scale. 
With concern to net profit margins in the ridesharing business unit, Uber 
converts revenue into profit in a more efficient way than the competitors. For 
this segment, Uber presents a net profit margin of 7.2% in 2018, Lyft shows 
only -42.3% for the same year4.  
Regarding the food delivery segment, some competitors have a better 
performance concerning net profit margin, like GrubHub, with 14.5%5, for 
2017 and Amazon with 0.4%6. Other competitors perform worse than Uber, 
 
2 Millenial Money Man. 2019. “Uber vs. Lyft: Which Is Better to Drive For?” 
Accessed January 1, 2020. https://millennialmoneyman.com/uber-vs-lyft/. 
3   Uber Technologies, Inc. 2019. “Uber - FORM S-1 REGISTRATION 
STATEMENT.” Accessed January 1, 2020c. 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1543151/000119312519103850/d
647752ds1.htm. 
4 Lyft. 2019. “Lyft - FORM S-1 REGISTRATION STATEMENT.” 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1759509/000119312519059849/d
633517ds1.htm. 
5 Grubhub, Inc. n.d. “Grubhub, Inc. - Investors - Annual and Proxy Reports.” 
Accessed January 1, 2020. https://investors.grubhub.com/investors/annual-
and-proxy-reports/default.aspx. 













Figure 4 - Uber and Lyft rides per 
driver and riders per driver 
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which is the case of Delivery Hero, with -64.0%  and Takeaway.com -27.7%, 
for the same year. 
Shareholder Structure 
The governance structure of Uber is one share-one vote. After the IPO, more 
than 50% of the shares belong to executives, directors, and early-investors, 
and 17% belong to Travis Kalanick, Garrett Camp, and Ryan Graves 
together. Softbank had 16.3% of shares and Alphabet 22.3%.  
Travis Kalanick is the co-founder and former CEO of Uber, who was ousted 
by private investors in 2017 due to toxic workplace culture. Since then, the 
relationship between Kalanick and CEO Dara Khosrowshahi has not been 
easy. Khosrowshahi wants to give Uber a new path, and Kalanick and its 
shady past keep staying in the picture7. However, as the lockup period 
ended, Kalanick started to sell his shares, which gave a bad signal to the 
market. Despite this, Uber announced that the former CEO is leaving the 
board of directors, putting an end in these ten years' relation with the 
company8. This may be the reason why Kalanick started to sell shares since 
the beginning and can be seen as favourable for the company since now the 
CEO has room to pursue a new path running the company. 
Competitive Landscape 
There is not any company providing all the services provided by Uber, in the 
same geographies. 
In the ridesharing market, Uber still faces intense competition. In the US and 
Canada, Lyft is Uber’s main rival, offering ridesharing services, autonomous 
vehicles, e-bikes, and scooters. Also, in this segment, we can point out Ola 
Cabs, Didi, and Bolt. Ola Cabs operates in India, Australia, New Zealand, 
and the UK. Didi is focused on the ridesharing market in Asia and Australia, 
and it’s one of the main responsible for Uber leaving the country. Bolt is 
operating in Europe, Africa, Asia, Mexico, and Australia.   
 
7 New York Times. n.d. “With Uber’s I.P.O., Dara Khosrowshahi Is Taking 
Travis Kalanick’s Company Public - The New York Times.” Accessed 
January 2, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/03/technology/uber-ipo-
ceo-dara-khosrowshahi-travis-kalanick.html 
8 Uber Technologies, Inc. 2019. “Uber Technologies, Inc. - Travis Kalanick 




Figure 5 - Uber's main competitors 
and its segments 
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In the food delivery segment, GrubHub, Delivery Hero, Just Eat, 
Takeaway.com, Swiggy, Zomato, Deliveroo, DoorDash, and Amazon are the 
main competitors, offering food delivery services in different geographies.  
In what concerns to autonomous vehicles, Uber faces severe competition 
and competitors are achieving knowledge and expertise quickly in this 
segment. The main competitors are Waymo, Aptiv, Tesla, or General 
Motors9. Waymo is a company owned by Google, founded in 2009, and it is 
considered as being the most avant-garde in this sector since the company 
installed a self-driving mini-van to Chrysler in 2017 and placed Waymo fully 
autonomous driving cars in Phoenix in 201810. Uber has been improving its 
technology and safety concerns partnering with car producer brands, like 
Toyota and Volvo Cars11.  
The conclusion about the competitive landscape around Uber is that the 
company has the scale advantage of being all over the world. Also, this 
market has meagre switching costs and low barriers to entry, so the 
competitors can be very local and may change several times in just a year. 
Value Drivers 
In terms of value drivers, different segments correspond to distinct drivers of 
value. However, some of the costs faced by Uber are related to several 
segments. 
The most considerable portion of costs is the cost of revenue, which 
represents c. 26 % of total costs and 49% of revenue. However, cost of 
revenue as a percentage of revenue and total costs have been decreasing 
over the years, making the company more efficient. This portion of costs 
includes mainly insurance expenses, credit card processing fees, amounts 
related to fare chargebacks, excess driver incentives, and costs incurred with 
carriers for Uber Freight transportation and other costs. 
 
9 Financial Times. 2019. “Uber’s Conflicting Self-Driving Fleet Vision | FT 
Alphaville.” Accessed January 1, 2020b. 
https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2019/04/12/1555079659000/Uber-s-conflicting-
self-driving-fleet-vision/. 
10 Forbes. n.d. “Key Milestones Of Waymo - Google’s Self-Driving Cars.” 
Accessed January 1, 2020a. 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/09/21/key-milestones-of-
waymo-googles-self-driving-cars/.  
11 Deloitte. 2019a. “Autonomous Driving - Moonshot Project with Quantum 
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Insurance costs are a crucial part of the expenses incurred by Uber, and the 
company shows a competitive advantage in these costs when compared to 
its peers. The scale of Uber allows the company to negotiate better terms for 
its insurance contracts12. Credit card processing fees accounted for 18% of 
the cost of revenue in 2017 and 21% in 2016, with its relevance in the cost 
of revenue growing by 63% from 2016 to 2017. Excess driver incentives are 
driver incentives when the fee that has to be paid to the driver exceeds the 
price paid by the end-consumer. These costs have been accounting for 
around 15% of the cost of revenue in 2018.   
Uber also incurs in operations and support costs, which are mainly consumer 
support and driver background checks costs. These expenses typically 
increase less than revenue because there are economies of scale involved. 
Although this verifies in Uber, these costs may also be higher because the 
background checks requirements are more restrict year over year, and the 
company also wants to improve its customer and driver support. 
Uber also incurs costs related to sales and marketing. These expenses 
include stock-based compensations, consumer discounts, promotions, 
refunds and credits, driver referrals, and advertising expenses. Discounts 
are used to attract customers since Uber has not pricing power and needs 
to decrease prices to attract consumers and achieve dominance in each 
market. In 2018, consumer discounts accounted for around 12% of 
revenues, and driver referrals 1% of revenues.  
Driver referrals comprise payments done to existing drivers to refer new 
drivers. These costs are declining as a percentage of revenue, and as the 
revenues and dominance of Uber increase. 
In what concerns to research and development costs, Uber incurs in specific 
expenses related to the Autonomous Technology Group (ATG) and other 
technological investments, stock-based compensations, and further 
research and development expenses. The ATG is a corporate funded by 
Toyota, Soft Bank, DENSO Company, and Uber to accelerate the 
development and commercialization of automated vehicles3. The ATG 
investment is influenced by competitive landscape, market development, 
and partnerships with other companies.   
 
12 DBS Group research. 2019. “Ride-Sharing, Profitable or Not?” DBS 
Asian Insights, no. May: 1–33. 
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In terms of the balance sheet, Uber is a company with a light balance sheet 
because besides being a services provider company, it doesn’t hold a 
relevant portion of fixed assets.  
To determine the working capital, operating cash was based on comparables 
In terms of working capital, operating cash was based on a group of 
comparables, named by Uber3, and formed by tech companies that play a 
role in e-commerce companies.   
Ridesharing 
The ridesharing revenue comes from bookings done by costumers that we 
can decompose in price per mile and miles traveled. From the bookings, 
there are costs to be deducted to obtain revenue. Consumers pay a certain 
price for each ride, which is determined based on the miles traveled. From 
this, Uber has to pay fees to the drivers, besides the costs mentioned before 
(consumer discounts, and excess driver incentives). 
Uber Eats 
In the case of Uber Eats, the company extracts value from the food basket 
value and delivery fees, which together compose the price paid by end-
users. The restaurants charge a certain price for the food, from which Uber 
extracts a fixed percentage (around 25%) and Uber charges a delivery fee, 
that can be a fixed amount or a variable amount depending on the amount 
of the food basket and the distance of the delivery. 
Uber Freight 
Regarding Uber Freight, the company charges a price per shipment to the 
shippers and celebrates contracts with carries. Costs incurred with carriers 
accounted for 117% of Uber Freight revenue in 2018, making Uber Freight 
a heavy cost segment. 
New Mobility 
In the new mobility sector, the company extracts value from the price paid 
per minute by the users. However, Uber has to acquire the equipment in 
this segment. 
Trends and Forecast 
The revenue structure is expected to change over the following years 
because although the different business units are experiencing similar 
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macroeconomic conditions, each segment represents a different industry, 
with different competitors and drivers of value. Each of the sectors where 
Uber operates is in an embryonic stage, which gives it high growth 
projections but with risky uncertainties associated. 
Ridesharing  
Ridesharing has been growing fast, but it has a margin to go further. Uber 
has only penetrated, on average, 1% of the markets where it operates. In 
the countries where the company operates, people traveled 4.7 trillion 
vehicle miles in trips under 30 miles, of which just 26 billion miles were 
traveled in an Uber3. 
The generations to come are more willing to pick up an Uber instead of using 
their car, and we will also have more and more people using e-commerce 
platforms as the smartphone penetration grows.  
In this sense, one of the main trends affecting the ridesharing market is the 
decrease in vehicle ownership, which is a clear tendency among the younger 
generations. Vehicle ownership growth varies between -0.7% in 2017 and -
0,6% in 203013. This decrease is expected to influence ridesharing miles 
travelled inversely. 
The other factor affecting ridesharing is the smartphone penetration rate, 
which is assumed to influence positively, but less than proportionally, the 
ridesharing miles traveled. 
Uber identified six near-term priority countries that together represent an 
opportunity of 4,700 million miles per year. These are markets where Uber 
has already been, but it has to get out because of regulatory issues that are 
already being addressed with the respective governments. Expecting Uber 
to have these markets back in 2019, this translates in 47 more miles traveled 
in 2019 besides the normal company growth.  
Also, to adjust the revenue’s growth to the macroeconomic environment, it is 
essential to consider consumer spending in transportation growth, inflation 
rate, and fuel costs growth.  
Consumer spending growth on transportation varies from geography to 
geography, and it is assumed to affect the ridesharing miles traveled directly. 
 
13 Statista. 2019. “Passenger Cars - United States | Statista Market 
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The inflation rate in the US has been and is going to remain stable over the 
years, and it is expected to influence directly and positively the ridesharing 
price per mile, driver earnings and incentives per mile in the ridesharing 
segment.  
Fuel costs growth is expected to decrease c.1% in 2020 and increase 1% for 
the rest of the period, except for 2021, when growth expected is 0%14, 
influencing the price per mile positively but less than proportionally. 
In what concerns discounts, the company assumes it will continue to use 
them as a way to attract riders until it achieves dominance. As dominance is 
achieved, Uber can decrease discounts gradually. As so, and having in mind 
that Uber is already leading some markets, discounts will represent 10% of 
the revenue, since they have been accounting for 14% over the past years.  
Having this, the price per mile in 2020 and 2030 is 1.34 and 1.79 in the US 
and Canada, 0.91 and 1.22 in Latin America, 1.11 and 1.49 in EMEA, and is 
0.55 and 0.74 in the APAC. Miles travelled in 2020 and 2030 are 22,297 and 
34,380 for US and Canada, 11,613 and 27,437 for LATAM region, 8,293 and 
26,204 for EMEA region and 9,445 and 19,421 for APAC region, 
respectively.  
Because Uber charges fixed fees to end-consumers but pays dynamically to 
drivers, trips of a particular driver may represent a cost for the company 
because the price paid by the users does not offset the driver earnings that 
Uber has to pay. These are excess driver incentives, which are expected to 
grow the same way driver earnings grow. 
In terms of revenue forecast, ridesharing will decrease its impact on total 
revenues to 40% for 2030.  
Uber Eats 
One of the main features driving the Uber Eats segment is the industry’s 
growth. The food delivery market has been growing 15 times more than 
foodstuffs and beverages market since 2013, at an average rate of 77%3. 
However, this growth is expected to slow down over the future years. As so, 
the forecast rate assumed is five times higher than the growth rate for 
foodstuffs and beverages market.   
Consumer spending growth in foodstuffs and beverages varies throughout 
geographies, and its average for the US if 2.94%, 1.55% for LATAM, 2.25% 
for EMEA, and 2.49% for APAC.  
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Additionally, smartphone penetration also plays a role in this segment, 
directly affecting Uber Eats gross bookings.  
In 2030, revenue for Uber Eats accounts for 12.53% of total revenue. 
Other Revenue 
Other revenue is mainly composed of Uber Freight, new mobility, and ATG, 
and other technology programs.  
For the launching of ridesharing and eats, the company had years of around 
500% revenue growth, followed by 100% on the following year, at the early 
years of each segment. Because of that, a new segment factor was added 
to the forecast of new segment revenues, following this pattern of growth. 
Regarding the other revenue forecast (Uber freight, New mobility, and 
Autonomous segment), it is expected an increase in its weight on total 
revenues, from 26.2% in 2020 to 47.0% in 2030. 
Uber Freight’s revenues and costs were directly forecasted, assuming that 
this is a heavy-cost segment and having the past launch of other segments 
in mind.  
Uber Freight 
For Freight it is assumed that the 500% of revenue growth due to the new 
segment factor happened in 2019 and that revenue growth attributable to 
this factor is 100% in 2020, 75% in 2021, 30% in 2022, and 10% for the 
following years. 
Also, the freight market is expected to grow by 4%15, which was also 
considered for the Uber freight revenue forecast. 
In what concerns to this industry’s specific costs, in 2018, costs incurred with 
Uber Freight Transportation accounted for 117% of Uber Freight revenue. In 
the expansion years (until 2023), this percentage is expected to be the same, 
decreasing to 95% for the following years.  
New Mobility 
New Mobility is also a relatively new segment at Uber for which the same 
new segment factor was assumed. This can be supposed because Uber is 
 
15 Mordor Intelligence, Mordor. 2019. “Freight Forwarding Market | Growth, 
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leading most of the markets where it operates16. Additionally, this industry is 
growing at 19%17. 
 
ATG 
Finally, one of the newest and more complex businesses is the autonomous 
cars segment. This industry is expected to grow at 36%18, which is assumed 
as the forecast rate for this segment at Uber. 
General Costs 
In addition to excess driver incentives, credit card processing fees, and 
insurance expenses are the main costs associated with the cost of revenue.  
In what concerns with credit card processing fees, during the financial crisis 
of 2009, the Federal Reserve and European Central Bank implemented an 
economic policy that reduced drastically interest rates to minimum historical 
values. After 2010, these interest rates started a smooth increase that never 
reached more than 3% until mid-2019. Since banking institutions were not 
creating profit from loans, meaning that interest rates were too low to 
generate money from giving it to costumers, banks were forced to change 
strategy. Consequently, banks are, nowadays, changing its focus to fees 
applicable to costumers and companies, which implies that costs associated 
with bank involvement are increasing to banks be able to be gainful.19. This 
factor suggests an increase in credit card processing fees for Uber. 
Nevertheless, Uber founded a new unit, Uber Money, whose objectives are 
 
16 Fortune. 2019. “Uber’s Custom Electric Scooter to Roll Out by Year’s 
End | Fortune.” Accessed January 1, 2020. 
https://fortune.com/2019/03/14/uber-custom-electric-scooters/. 
17 Global News Wire. 2019. “The World Market for Bike & Scooter Rentals, 




18 Market Watch. 2019. “Self-Driving Car Market Global Industry Trends, 
Share, Size and Forecast Report By 2023|With CAGR of 36.2% - 




19 EURACTIV. n.d. “Banks Should Charge Customers Higher Fees, Says 
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to decrease fees paid to banks on payments’ process to drivers and 
costumers, namely creating credit and debit cards to be employed 
exclusively by Uber users, but only with impact for whole company in several 
years due to limited usage on ridesharing division now 20 21. 
In terms of operations and support costs, the most relevant portion is 
consumer support and driver background checks. Law authorities are 
increasing scrutiny in concern with these service-providers and technological 
companies22, which implies that Uber is forced to review its drivers’ checks, 
not only because of law concerns but also because Uber is currently facing 
reputational processes with drivers that sex assaulted costumers. Other 
costs on operations and support also comprise fees with customer support. 
In recent years, companies around the world are increasing concern about 
consumer experience because it measures service quality and customer 
appreciation, which is one of the main concerns of Uber23. Besides that, Uber 
expects to invest in hiring new employees to support the growth of new 
products and markets3. As so, it is expected that these costs grow 1.5 times 
the revenue growth until 2022. From 2022 until 2030, the revenue growth is 
expected to drive this caption’s growth.  
The sales and marketing costs include driver and advertising expenses. 
These marketing expenses are increasing, because Uber needs to invest on 
it to increase revenues, meaning that forecast was done based on revenues 
 
20 Forbes. 2019. “Uber’s Fintech Strategy: A Conversation With Peter 
Hazlehurst, Head Of Uber Money.” Accessed January 1, 2020b. 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ronshevlin/2019/11/04/a-peek-into-ubers-
fintech-strategy-a-conversation-with-peter-hazlehurst-head-of-uber-money/. 
21 Uber Technologies, Inc. 2019. “Introducing Uber Money | Uber 
Newsroom.” Accessed January 1, 2020a. 
https://www.uber.com/newsroom/introducing-uber-money/. 
22 Business Insider. 2019. “Uber Is Facing More Regulatory Woes - 
Business Insider - Business Insider.” Accessed January 1, 2020. 
https://www.businessinsider.com/uber-faces-more-regulatory-woes-2019-9. 
23 Customer Contact Week Digital. 2018. “Uber on Creating a New Global 
Customer Experience Through Rebranding | CCW Digital | Customer 
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performance per business unit, and also, advertising spending worldwide, 
which is growing around 5% until 202224.  
The costs associated with research and development are ATG and other 
technological programs, which depend on macroeconomic context and 
competitive landscape.  
Having the competitive landscape and the latest news in mind, it is believed 
that this investment will increase less than the average growth of the past 
years but will keep growing until 2030. As so, the expected growth for this 
investment is 100% for 2020, 75% for 2021, 30% for 2022, 10% from 2023 
to 2024, 5% from 2025 to 2027 and 1% from 2028 to 2030.  
Operating Cash and Capital Expenditure 
Since Uber has a light balance sheet, the Company also presents a low 
degree of Working Capital (WC). The operational cash included in WC is 
assumed as the same 6% of revenues for the 10-year forecast period. 
The capital expenditure forecast was done based on property and equipment 
and intangible assets. Property and equipment, for 10-year forecast period, 
was assumed as 2019’s percentage of revenues, which is 10%, meaning 
that company will invest less in the future, due to evolution of business and 
no need of investment in property and equipment, only used for support 
centers, administrative tasks, and management purpose. 
For future performance, Uber’s net profit is expected to improve. In terms of 
gross margin, this indicator will achieve a value of 32% in 2030. 
Regarding the cost of revenue, its percentage of revenues will decrease to 
36.6% in 2030. 
Valuation 
Uber’s valuation was performed using two different methods of valuation. 
Firstly, the Discounted Cash Flow method (DCF), implying that the company 
is valued separately on each unit, namely operational, non-operational, and 
financial, and then, each valuation is added. Secondly, the multiple valuation 
is following valuation done to comparables based on ratios approach, such 
as EV/Sales, EV/EBITDA, or EV/EBIT. 
 
24 Statista. n.d. “• Growth of Advertising Worldwide 2000-2021 | Statista.” 










Page 19 of 28 
 
Discounted Cash Flow 
Considering the scenario of an undeveloped company, growth rate results 
from the evaluation of return on new invested capital and reinvestment rate. 
In this sense, the growth rate for the company is 4.9%, achieved using the 
reinvestment rate of a group of comparable companies25. 
The reinvestment rate was inferred based on a group of 
comparable companies weighted average reinvestment rate25 that 
are companies operating in each business segment of Uber, 
namely Amazon, GrubHub, XPO Logistics, and other six 
companies. In this sense, the growth rate for the company is 4.9%, 
achieved using the reinvestment rate of a group of comparable companies25, 
operating in each business segment of Uber (namely Amazon, GrubHub, 
XPO Logistics and other six companies).  
The company valuation is based on unlevered free cash flow discounted at 
the respective Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC), with a value of 
8.3%. To achieve unlevered beta was used regression analysis with Uber’s 
(re), 10-year US government bonds (assumed as risk-free rate – rf) and 
S&P500 (assumed as the risk of the market – rm) weekly returns. After 
achieving an unlevered beta of 0.95, its value is levered to 1.77 with a debt-
to-equity ratio of 1.1025. In order to compare beta levered, the same group of 
comparables had a value of 1.31 based on each segment where the 
company operates, weighted with gross bookings per business unit for Uber. 
So, the cost of equity (re) is calculated using Capital Asset Pricing Model – 
CAPM – with a market risk premium of 5.0% and a risk-free rate of 1.7%26 
(Federal Reserve, 2019),  reaching a value of 10.6%. 
In terms of capital structure, the Company is composed of 48.5% of equity 
and 51.5% of debt in 2019. For the 10-year forecast period, debt-to-equity 
was assumed as similar to a group of comparable companies, being 25.5% 
of equity and 74.5% of debt to achieve a capital structure that allows the 
company to invest in several segments for future periods. 
The enterprise value for December 2020 is $23.4bn inserting a cost of debt 
of 1.8%, calculated concerning the rating of Uber, probability of default and 
loss given default on this company. To obtain the equity value, net debt, and 
 
25 Thomson Reuters. n.d. “Home | Thomson Reuters.” Accessed January 1, 
2020. https://www.thomsonreuters.com/en.html. 
26 U.S Federal Reserve. 2019. “Federal Reserve Board - Data.” Accessed 
January 1, 2020. https://www.federalreserve.gov/data.htm. 
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minority interest items ($-41.3bn) are subtracted from the enterprise value, 
resulting in an equity value of $64.7bn. 
The target price achieved is $38.47/share, for 1,683 million shares 
outstanding.  
Multiples 
Multiple valuation for Uber was done based on 31 December 2019 expected. 
Different business units are associated with different comparable 
companies, but its impact on the total valuation of the Company is 
challenging to estimate for the future, meaning that multiple valuation for 
each segment will be added to others to achieve Uber’s valuation. 
Regarding ridesharing, comparable companies across the globe are Lyft, 
Grab, Yandex Taxi, Ola Cabs, and Bolt. From this group of comparable 
companies, only Lyft is available to multiple valuation, since the remaining 
companies are privately held. In what concerns the food delivery segment, 
excluding the private companies, comparable companies considered are 
GrubHub, Deliveroo, Just Eat, Takeaway.com, and Amazon. 
In terms of the Other segment, it aggregates freight, new mobility, and 
autonomous business unit and comparable companies considered are only 
from freight segment, due to new mobility companies be private and 
autonomous segment have a rigorous assessment of comparables. So, 
comparable companies used are C.H.Robinson, XPO Logistics, Echo Global 
Logistics, and Hub Group. 
Since Uber’s EBITDA and EBIT are both negative, the multiple that is more 
feasible to use is EV/Sales. For the ridesharing business unit, EV/Sales is 
2.90x, corresponding to a valuation of this segment of $32.6bn. Though, for 
the food delivery segment, the range of the multiple is between 3.30x and 
12.70x, implying a minimum EV of $10.2bn and a maximum EV of $39.3bn, 
being on average $21.5bn. For the Other segment, the EV/Sales ranges 
between 0.3x and 2.9x, which implies a minimum EV of $1.5bn and a 
maximum EV of $14.8bn. On average, for this segment, the EV implied is 
$5.3bn.  
Finally, taking as base the EV/Sales average for each business segment, EV 
is $60.1bn, implying a price per share of $59.91 for Dec-2020. 
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Sensitivity and Scenario Analysis 
To conclude, taking as base the EV/Sales average for each business 
segment, EV for Uber is $59.5bn, implying a price per share of $59.91 for 
Dec-2020. 
The sensitivity analysis is done changing WACC from a minimum of 6.3% 
and a maximum of 10.3% and growth rate from a minimum of 1.8% and a 
maximum of 5.8%, concluding that increase in growth and decrease in cost 
of capital will make price per share to increase to $379.90, meaning that Uber 
growing more and accounting for less risk will make share value to increase, 
and on the opposite side, lowest value per share is $3.83. 
Besides that, ATG and New Mobility segments are tested in three different 
scenarios. For ATG, keeping the amounts invested equally for the three 
scenarios, in the worst scenario, it is assumed that this segment will grow at 
a slower pace than the market, and in the best scenario, it is assumed that 
revenue growth will outperform the industry’s growth by 20%. For the worst 
and best scenarios,  the price per share accomplished is  $7.71 and $120.15, 
respectively. 
This shows that the company highly depends on the outcome of the ATG 
investment, and also, if it can implement these vehicles sooner and better 
than the competitors, it will affect its price positively.  
For New Mobility, the worst scenario assumes the new segment factor as 
zero, and the best scenario assumes the growth attributable to the new factor 
is 100% for 2020 and 2021, 75% for 2022, 30% for 2023 and 10% for the 
following years, resulting in a price per share of $-28.76 and $109.35, for the 
worst and best scenarios, respectively. 
This shows that if revenue growth on new mobility is just 18% in the following 
years, which is very unlikely to happen, it can be a disaster. However, this 
scenario assumes this is a situation to maintain over the years, which is 
unrealistic since Uber would react to this, preventing this disaster from 
happening in consecutive years.  
Recommendation 
With a $ 38.47 target price, we leave a moderate buy as a recommendation. 
We see for Uber a future of opportunities to diversify its sources of revenues, 
but we cannot forget the risks associated with ATG, the regulatory 
restrictions, and also a possible difficulty in raising more debt.  
Reasons to be optimistic  
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• Scale: Uber has a larger scale than most of its competitors, which 
provides them more data to define and analyze consumer behavior 
accurately, and the ability to enjoy synergies in its cost structure, 
improving efficiency; 
• Dominance: the company is a significant player in most of the 
markets where it operates, and it has been working and will continue 
to work on acquisitions of local competitors that operate as major 
players in markets that Uber has not the capacity to penetrate; 
• Profitability: we expect Uber to become profitable in 2028, 
overtaking one of the most challenging features of this market and 
against what the market believes; 
• E-commerce revolution: Uber’s best friend is the fact that people 
are changing their way of contract most of the services. In this sense, 
the company acts in a favorable context. 
Reasons to be careful 
• Return of the investment on ATG: if the company continues to 
invest in ATG and the revenue grows slower than the industry itself, 
this will be very damaging to the company’s value; 
• Regulatory and law restrictions: Uber may face barriers to 
maintain its activities in some geographies, namely in the six 
countries identified as near-term priority countries; 
• Challenging raise of debt: the investments that Uber is planning 
imply financing needs that can be blocked by debt-financing 
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1. Reformulated Statement of Operations 
Reformulated and Forecasted Statement of Operations FY16A FY17A FY18A FY19E FY20F FY21F FY22F FY23F FY24F FY25F FY26F FY27F FY28F FY29F FY30F
Year Ended December 31, (in millions)
Core
Revenue
Ridesharing 3,535 6,888 9,182 10,127 11,258 12,857 15,029 17,465 20,271 23,505 26,785 30,482 34,649 39,344 44,635
UberEats 103 587 1,460 2,555 3,093 3,609 4,222 4,959 5,749 6,668 7,709 8,916 10,316 11,939 13,823
Other 207 457 628 2,564 5,105 9,095 12,406 14,602 17,256 20,481 24,419 29,255 35,226 42,638 51,887
Total Revenue 3,845 7,932 11,270 15,246 19,456 25,561 31,657 37,026 43,277 50,653 58,913 68,654 80,191 93,922 110,344
Revenue growth 106% 42% 35% 28% 31% 24% 17% 17% 17% 16% 17% 17% 17% 17%
COGS
Cost of revenue, exclusive of depreciation and amortization
Costs incurred for Uber Freight Transportation - (71) (359) (477) (4,592) (8,196) (10,942) (10,057) (11,414) (12,955) (14,704) (16,689) (18,942) (21,500) (24,402)
Excess payments to Partners (507) (530) (837) (1,111) (1,173) (1,233) (1,292) (1,353) (1,417) (1,486) (1,546) (1,610) (1,677) (1,747) (1,820)
Other (1,721) (3,559) (4,427) (5,879) (6,379) (6,925) (7,527) (8,180) (8,879) (9,643) (10,414) (11,251) (12,157) (13,140) (14,205)
Total Cost of Revenue, exclusive of depreciation and amortization (2,228) (4,160) (5,623) (7,467) (12,143) (16,355) (19,762) (19,589) (21,711) (24,084) (26,665) (29,550) (32,776) (36,386) (40,427)
Operations and support
Other (860) (1,324) (1,501) (2,950) (4,172) (6,136) (8,331) (9,744) (11,389) (13,331) (15,504) (18,068) (21,104) (24,718) (29,040)
Sales and marketing
Consumer discounts, promotions, refunds and credits (618) (949) (1,400) (1,540) (1,694) (1,863) (2,050) (2,255) (2,480) (2,728) (3,001) (3,301) (3,631) (3,994) (4,394)
Driver referrals (167) (199) (136) (221) (256) (296) (325) (358) (394) (433) (433) (433) (413) (413) (413)
Other (796) (1,367) (1,606) (1,344) (1,313) (1,276) (1,233) (1,193) (1,154) (1,118) (1,086) (1,056) (1,027) (999) (972)
Total COGS (4,669) (7,999) (10,266) (13,523) (19,579) (25,926) (31,701) (33,139) (37,128) (41,693) (46,690) (52,409) (58,952) (66,511) (75,247)
GROSS PROFIT (824) (67) 1,004 1,724 (123) (365) (44) 3,887 6,149 8,960 12,223 16,245 21,239 27,411 35,098
Gross Margin (%) -21% -1% 9% 11% -0.6% -1% 0% 10% 14% 18% 21% 24% 26% 29% 31.8%
Loss from Equity Method Investment, net of income taxes - - (42) - - - - - - - - - - - -
General and administrative
Other (932) (2,190) (1,999) (4,155) (3,891) (3,834) (4,749) (3,703) (4,328) (5,065) (2,946) (3,433) (1,604) (1,878) (2,207)
G&A as % of Revenues -24% -28% -18% -27% -20% -15% -15% -10% -10% -10% -5% -5% -2% -2% -2%
Research and Development (819) (1,176) (1,440) (2,964) (5,612) (9,573) (12,385) (13,661) (15,068) (15,909) (16,791) (17,730) (18,069) (18,433) (18,660)
ATG and Other Technology Programs (230) (384) (457) (2,595) (5,189) (9,081) (11,806) (12,986) (14,285) (14,999) (15,749) (16,537) (16,702) (16,869) (16,869)
All other research and development expenses (589) (792) (983) (369) (423) (492) (579) (675) (784) (909) (1,042) (1,194) (1,367) (1,564) (1,791)
R&D as % of Revenues -21% -15% -13% -19% -29% -37% -39% -37% -35% -31% -29% -26% -23% -20% -17%
Stock based compensations (128) (137) (172) (586) (617) (738) (880) (1,027) (1,195) (1,391) (1,600) (1,842) (2,122) (2,445) (2,822)
Operations and support (21) (30) (15) (29) (34) (39) (45) (53) (62) (72) (83) (96) (110) (127) (147)
Sales and marketing (13) (9) (9) (15) (17) (20) (23) (27) (31) (36) (41) (47) (54) (62) (71)
General and administrative (49) (73) (83) (173) (143) (188) (233) (273) (319) (373) (434) (506) (591) (692) (813)
G&A stock based compensations as % of revenues -1% -1% -1% -1% -1% -1% -1% -1% -1% -1% -1% -1% -1% -1% -1%
Research and Development (45) (25) (65) (369) (423) (492) (579) (675) (784) (909) (1,042) (1,194) (1,367) (1,564) (1,791)
Operating Income/Loss (2,703) (3,570) (2,649) (5,981) (10,243) (14,511) (18,057) (14,504) (14,442) (13,404) (9,114) (6,760) (555) 4,654 11,410
Depreciation and amortization (320) (510) (426) (550) (474) (622) (817) (1,072) (1,408) (1,848) (1,848) (1,848) (1,848) (1,848) (1,848)
EBIT (3,023) (4,080) (3,075) (6,531) (10,717) (15,133) (18,874) (15,576) (15,850) (15,252) (10,962) (8,608) (2,403) 2,806 9,562
Operating Adjusted Taxes 481 894 3,132 1,413 2,318 3,274 4,083 3,370 3,429 3,300 2,371 1,862 520 (607) (2,069)
NOPLAT (2,542) (3,186) 57 (5,118) (8,399) (11,860) (14,791) (12,207) (12,421) (11,953) (8,591) (6,746) (1,883) 2,199 7,493
Non-core
Other income (expense), net
Foreign currency exchange gains (losses), net (91) 42 (45) (99) (126) (166) (205) (240) (281) (329) (382) (445) (520) (609) (716)
Gain in divestitures - - 3,214 - - - - - - - - - - - -
Unrealized gain on investments - - 1,996 1 - - - - - - - - - - -
Other 66 44 225 494 631 829 1,027 1,201 1,403 1,643 1,910 2,226 2,600 3,046 3,578
Non-operating Income (25) 86 5,390 397 505 663 821 961 1,123 1,314 1,528 1,781 2,080 2,437 2,863
Non-operating Taxes (568) (556) (3,652) (86) (109) (143) (178) (208) (243) (284) (331) (385) (450) (527) (619)
Non-operating Income before other income/expenses (593) (470) 1,738 311 396 520 644 753 880 1,030 1,198 1,396 1,630 1,909 2,243
Income from Discontinued Operations, net of income taxes 2,876 - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Other comprehensive income (loss), net of tax 2 (4) (185) (185) (185) (185) (185) (185) (185) (185) (185) (185) (185) (185) (185)
Non-operating Result 2,285 (474) 1,553 126 211 335 459 568 695 845 1,013 1,211 1,445 1,724 2,058
Financial 
Other income (expense), net
Interest expense 22 71 104 229 292 383 474 555 649 759 883 1,029 1,202 1,408 1,654
Change in fair value of embedded derivates 142 (173) (501) (1,101) (408) (408) (408) (408) (408) (408) (408) (408) (408) (408) (408)
Interest expense (334) (479) (648) (694) (2,312) (3,245) (4,740) (7,159) (10,715) (15,881) - - - - -
Financial Income (170) (581) (1,045) (1,567) (2,429) (3,270) (4,674) (7,012) (10,475) (15,530) 475 621 794 1,000 1,246
Financial Tax Shield 60 205 237 339 525 707 1,011 1,517 2,266 3,360 (103) (134) (172) (216) (269)
Less: net loss attributable to redeemable non-controlling interest, net of tax - - 10 - - - - - - - - - - - -
Financial Result (111) (376) (798) (1,228) (1,903) (2,563) (3,662) (5,495) (8,209) (12,170) 372 487 622 783 976
Comprehensive income (loss) attributable to Uber Technologies, Inc./Net income (368) (4,037) 812 (6,220) (10,091) (14,088) (17,995) (17,134) (19,935) (23,278) (7,206) (5,048) 184 4,707 10,528
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2. Reformulated Balance Sheet  
  
Reformulated and Forecasted Balance Sheet FY16A FY17A FY18A FY19E FY20F FY21F FY22F FY23F FY24F FY25F FY26F FY27F FY28F FY29F FY30F
Year Ended December 31, (in millions)
Core
Assets 3,009 2,863 5,484 6,688 7,085 9,590 12,430 15,416 18,872 21,983 25,340 29,230 33,754 39,033 45,218
Cash and cash equivalents 220 454 670 906 1,157 1,519 1,882 2,201 2,573 3,011 3,502 4,081 4,767 5,583 6,560
Account Receivables 503 739 919 1,256 1,594 2,095 2,594 3,034 3,547 4,151 4,828 5,626 6,572 7,697 9,043
Prepaid expenses and other current assets 158 425 860 1,517 2,289 3,292 4,633 6,298 8,366 9,700 11,067 12,611 14,356 16,328 18,557
Property and equipment, net 2,077 1,192 1,641 1,517 1,935 2,543 3,149 3,683 4,305 5,039 5,860 6,829 7,977 9,343 10,976
PP&E as % of revenues 54.02% 15.03% 14.56% 9.95% 9.95% 9.95% 9.95% 9.95% 9.95% 9.95% 9.95% 9.95% 9.95% 9.95% 9.95%
Intangible assets, net 51 53 82 72 110 141 172 199 82 82 82 82 82 82 82
Equity method investments - - 1,312 1,421 - - - - - - - - - - -
Liabilities (2,007) (3,612) (4,127) (4,355) (4,703) (6,489) (8,346) (9,209) (10,525) (12,009) (13,406) (15,234) (17,152) (19,579) (22,433)
Accounts payable  (280)  (213)  (150)  (120)  (230)  (305)  (373)  (390)  (437)  (490)  (549)  (616)  (693)  (782)  (885) 
Accrued and other current liabilities  (1,010)  (2,306)  (2,825)  (3,930)  (3,962)  (5,463)  (7,073)  (8,077)  (9,333)  (10,792)  (12,334)  (14,208)  (16,345)  (18,931)  (22,005)
Other long-term liabilities (717) (1,093) (1,152) (304) (511) (722) (900) (743) (756) (727) (523) (410) (115) 134 456
Core Invested Capital 1,002 (749) 1,357 2,333 2,382 3,101 4,084 6,207 8,347 9,974 11,934 13,996 16,602 19,454 22,784
Non-core
Assets 5,199 7,189 8,595 8,279 8,294 8,313 8,336 8,364 8,340 8,383 8,383 8,383 8,383 8,383 8,383
Assets held for sale 57 1,138 406 - - - - - - - - - - - -
Intangible assets, net 0 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Goodwill 39 39 153 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172
Investments 5,102 5,969 7,985 8,043 8,043 8,043 8,043 8,043 7985 7985 7985 7985 7985 7985 7985
Other assets - 42 51 64 79 97 120 148 183 226 226 226 226 226 226
Liabilities  (1,566)  (2,264)  (3,108)  (4,407)  (3,508)  (3,902)  (4,371)  (4,932)  (5,607)  (6,443)  (6,828)  (7,246)  (7,699)  (8,190)  (8,722) 
Accrued and other current liabilities  (78)  (235)  (160)  (1,459)  (310)  (431)  (599)  (834)  (1,160)  (1,614)  (1,614)  (1,614)  (1,614)  (1,614)  (1,614) 
Short-term insurance reserves (87) (469) (941) (941) (1,021) (1,109) (1,205) (1,309) (1,421) (1,544) (1,667) (1,801) (1,946) (2,103) (2,274)
Long-term insurance reserves (1,315) (1,527) (1,996) (1,996) (2,166) (2,351) (2,556) (2,777) (3,015) (3,274) (3,536) (3,820) (4,128) (4,461) (4,823)
Liabilities held for sale  (86)  (33)  (11) (11) (11) (11) (11) (11) (11) (11) (11) (11) (11) (11) (11)
Non-Core Invested Capital 3,633 4,925 5,487 3,872 4,787 4,411 3,965 3,432 2,733 1,940 1,555 1,137 684 193 (339)
Financial
Assets 7,506 5,374 9,909 20,484 27,416 37,486 52,110 73,350 104,196 148,996 148,996 148,996 148,996 148,996 148,996
Money market funds 679 1,221 1,505 2,162 2,162 2,162 2,162 2,162 2162 2162 2162 2162 2162 2162 2162
Excess cash 5,960 4,153 6,034 15,952 22,884 32,954 47,578 68,818 99,665 144,464 144,464 144,464 144,464 144,464 144,464
Investments 867 - 2,370 2,370 2,370 2,370 2,370 2,370 2370 2370 2370 2370 2370 2370 2370
Liabilities  (5,626)  (5,897)  (9,961)  (14,227)  (19,147)  (26,530)  (38,567)  (58,142)  (87,005)  (129,009)  (126,708)  (124,192)  (121,859)  (119,364)  (116,888)
Accrued and other current liabilities  (68)  (172)  (172)  (239)  (326)  (463)  (677)  (1,013)  (1,540)  (2,366)  (2,366)  (2,366)  (2,366)  (2,366)  (2,366)
Liabilities held for sale (817) (419) - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Long-term debt, net of current portion (3,087) (3,048) (6,869)  (13,218)  (18,436)  (25,875)  (37,794)  (57,081)  (85,441)  (126,631)  (124,330)  (121,814)  (119,481)  (116,986)  (114,510)
Other long-term liabilities  (1,654)  (2,258)  (2,920)  (770)  (385)  (193)  (96)  (48)  (24)  (12)  (12)  (12)  (12)  (12)  (12)
Financial Invested Capital 1,880 (523) (52) 6,257 8,269 10,956 13,543 15,208 17,192 19,987 22,288 24,804 27,137 29,632 32,108
Total Operational, Non-operational and Financial Invested capital 6,515 3,653 6,792 12,463 15,437 18,468 21,592 24,847 28,271 31,902 35,777 39,937 44,423 49,280 54,553
Total stockholders' equity (deficit) (4,596) (8,557) (7,385) (7,385) (6,374) (5,501) (4,747) (4,097) (3,536) (3,052) (2,634) (2,273) (1,962) (1,693) (1,461)
Growth on SE 86% -14% -14% -14% -14% -14% -14% -14% -14% -14% -14% -14% -14% -14%
Redeemable convertible preferred stock 11,111 12,210 14,177 19,848 21,811 23,968 26,339 28,944 31,807 34,953 38,411 42,210 46,385 50,973 56,014
Growth on RCPS 10% 16% 40% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%
Total equity attributable to shareholders 6,515 3,653 6,792 12,463 15,437 18,468 21,592 24,847 28,271 31,902 35,777 39,937 44,423 49,280 54,553
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3. Reformulated and Forecasted Cash Flow Statement  
Reformulated and Forecasted Cash Flow Statement FY16A FY17A FY18A FY19E FY20F FY21F FY22F FY23F FY24F FY25F FY26F FY27F FY28F FY29F FY30F
Year Ended December 31, (in millions)
CORE  
EBIT (3,023) (4,080) (3,075) (6,531) (10,717) (15,133) (18,874) (15,576) (15,850) (15,252) (10,962) (8,608) (2,403) 2,806 9,562
Taxes 481 894 3,132 1,413 2,318 3,274 4,083 3,370 3,429 3,300 2,371 1,862 520 (607) (2,069)
NOPLAT (2,542) (3,186) 57 (5,118) (8,399) (11,860) (14,791) (12,207) (12,421) (11,953) (8,591) (6,746) (1,883) 2,199 7,493
Depreciation & Amortization 320 510 426 550 474 622 817 1,072 1,408 1,848 1,848 1,848 1,848 1,848 1,848
Operating Cash Flow (2,222) (2,676) 483 (4,568) (7,925) (11,237) (13,974) (11,134) (11,013) (10,105) (6,743) (4,898) (35) 4,047 9,341
Invested capital - Fixed Assets 2,128 1,245 1,723 1,588 2,046 2,684 3,321 3,882 4,387 5,121 5,942 6,911 8,059 9,425 11,058
CAPEX 883  (478) 135  (458)  (638)  (637)  (561)  (505)  (734)  (822)  (969)  (1,148)  (1,366)  (1,634)
Net CAPEX 373  (904)  (415)  (932)  (1,260)  (1,454)  (1,634)  (1,913)  (2,582)  (2,670)  (2,817)  (2,996)  (3,214)  (3,482)
Invested Capital - NWC and Others (1,126) (1,994) (366) 745 336 417 763 2,325 3,960 4,854 5,992 7,085 8,543 10,030 11,726
Investment Cash Flow 1,241 (2,532) (1,526) (523) (1,341) (1,800) (3,195) (3,547) (3,476) (3,808) (3,910) (4,454) (4,701) (5,178)
Unlevered Core FCF (1,435) (2,049) (6,094) (8,447) (12,578) (15,774) (14,330) (14,561) (13,580) (10,550) (8,807) (4,489) (654) 4,164
NON-CORE
Non-Core Result 2,285 (474) 1,553 126 211 335 459 568 695 845 1,013 1,211 1,445 1,724 2,058
Non Core Investments 3,633 4,925 5,487 3,872 4,787 4,411 3,965 3,432 2,733 1,940 1,555 1,137 684 193 (339)
Invested Capital (1,292) (562) 1,615 (914) 376 447 532 699 793 386 418 453 491 532
Investment Cash Flow (1,292) (562) 1,615 (914) 376 447 532 699 793 386 418 453 491 532
Unlevered Non-core FCF (1,766) 991 1,740 (704) 710 905 1,100 1,394 1,637 1,398 1,629 1,898 2,215 2,591
FCFF (3,201) (1,058) (4,354) (9,151) (11,868) (14,869) (13,229) (13,167) (11,943) (9,152) (7,179) (2,591) 1,562 6,754
FINANCIAL
Financial Result (111) (376) (798) (1,228) (1,903) (2,563) (3,662) (5,495) (8,209) (12,170) 372 487 622 783 976
Net Financial Assets 1,880 (523) (52) 6,257 8,269 10,956 13,543 15,208 17,192 19,987 22,288 24,804 27,137 29,632 32,108
Investment in NFA (2,403) 472 6,308 2,012 2,687 2,587 1,665 1,984 2,795 2,301 2,516 2,333 2,495 2,476
Net Transactions with Shareholders 1,175 2,327 11,891 13,066 17,118 21,119 20,389 23,359 26,909 11,081 9,208 4,302 150 (5,254)
Total equity attributable to shareholders 6,515 3,653 6,792 12,463 15,437 18,468 21,592 24,847 28,271 31,902 35,777 39,937 44,423 49,280 54,553
Total comprehensive income  (368)  (4,037) 812  (6,220)  (10,091)  (14,088)  (17,995)  (17,134)  (19,935)  (23,278)  (7,206)  (5,048) 184 4,707 10,528
Investment Cash Flow 3,578 1,855 5,582 11,054 14,431 18,532 18,724 21,376 24,113 8,780 6,692 1,969 (2,345) (7,730)
Financial Cash Flow 3,202 1,057 4,355 9,151 11,868 14,869 13,229 13,167 11,943 9,152 7,179 2,591 (1,562) (6,754)
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Disclosures and Disclaimers 
Report  Recommendations 
Buy Expected total return (including expected capital gains and expected dividend 
yield) of more than 10% over a 12-month period. 
Hold Expected total return (including expected capital gains and expected dividend 
yield) between 0% and 10% over a 12-month period. 
Sell Expected negative total return (including expected capital gains and expected 
dividend yield) over a 12-month period. 
 
This report was prepared by [insert student’s name], a Master in Finance student of Nova School of 
Business and Economics (“Nova SBE”), within the context of the Field Lab – Equity Research. 
This report is issued and published exclusively for academic purposes, namely for academic evaluation 
and master graduation purposes, within the context of said Field Lab – Equity Research. It is not to be 
construed as an offer or a solicitation of an offer to buy or sell any security or financial instrument. 
This report was supervised by a Nova SBE faculty member, acting merely in an academic capacity, who 
revised the valuation methodology and the financial model. 
Given the exclusive academic purpose of the reports produced by Nova SBE students, it is Nova SBE 
understanding that Nova SBE, the author, the present report and its publishing, are excluded from the 
persons and activities requiring previous registration from local regulatory authorities. As such, Nova 
SBE, its faculty and the author of this report have not sought or obtained registration with or certification 
as financial analyst by any local regulator, in any jurisdiction. In Portugal, neither the author of this report 
nor his/her academic supervisor is registered with or qualified under COMISSÃO DO MERCADO DE VALORES 
MOBILIÁRIOS (“CMVM”, the Portuguese Securities Market Authority) as a financial analyst. No approval 
for publication or distribution of this report was required and/or obtained from any local authority, given 
the exclusive academic nature of the report. 
The additional disclaimers also apply: 
USA: Pursuant to Section 202 (a) (11) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, neither Nova SBE nor 
the author of this report are to be qualified as an investment adviser and, thus, registration with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”, United States of America’s securities market authority) 
is not necessary. Neither the author nor Nova SBE receive any compensation of any kind for the 
preparation of the reports. 
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Germany: Pursuant to §34c of the WpHG (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, i.e., the German Securities 
Trading Act), this entity is not required to register with or otherwise notify the Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (“BaFin”, the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority). It should 
be noted that Nova SBE is a fully-owned state university and there is no relation between the student’s 
equity reports and any fund raising programme. 
UK: Pursuant to section 22 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (the “FSMA”), for an activity 
to be a regulated activity, it must be carried on “by way of business”. All regulated activities are subject 
to prior authorization by the Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”). However, this report serves an 
exclusively academic purpose and, as such, was not prepared by way of business. The author - a 
Master’s student - is the sole and exclusive responsible for the information, estimates and forecasts 
contained herein, and for the opinions expressed, which exclusively reflect his/her own judgment at the 
date of the report. Nova SBE and its faculty have no single and formal position in relation to the most 
appropriate valuation method, estimates or projections used in the report and may not be held liable by 
the author’s choice of the latter. 
The information contained in this report was compiled by students from public sources believed to be 
reliable, but Nova SBE, its faculty, or the students make no representation that it is accurate or complete, 
and accept no liability whatsoever for any direct or indirect loss resulting from the use of this report or 
of its content. 
Students are free to choose the target companies of the reports. Therefore, Nova SBE may start 
covering and/or suspend the coverage of any listed company, at any time, without prior notice. The 
students or Nova SBE are not responsible for updating this report, and the opinions and 
recommendations expressed herein may change without further notice. 
The target company or security of this report may be simultaneously covered by more than one student. 
Because each student is free to choose the valuation method, and make his/her own assumptions and 
estimates, the resulting projections, price target and recommendations may differ widely, even when 
referring to the same security. Moreover, changing market conditions and/or changing subjective 
opinions may lead to significantly different valuation results. Other students’ opinions, estimates and 
recommendations, as well as the advisor and other faculty members’ opinions may be inconsistent with 
the views expressed in this report. Any recipient of this report should understand that statements 
regarding future prospects and performance are, by nature, subjective, and may be fallible. 
This report does not necessarily mention and/or analyze all possible risks arising from the investment 
in the target company and/or security, namely the possible exchange rate risk resulting from the security 
being denominated in a currency either than the investor’s currency, among many other risks. 
The purpose of publishing this report is merely academic and it is not intended for distribution among 
private investors. The information and opinions expressed in this report are not intended to be available 
to any person other than Portuguese natural or legal persons or persons domiciled in Portugal. While 
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preparing this report, students did not have in consideration the specific investment objectives, financial 
situation or particular needs of any specific person. Investors should seek financial advice regarding the 
appropriateness of investing in any security, namely in the security covered by this report. 
The author hereby certifies that the views expressed in this report accurately reflect his/her personal 
opinion about the target company and its securities. He/ She has not received or been promised any 
direct or indirect compensation for expressing the opinions or recommendation included in this report. 
[If applicable, it shall be added: “While preparing the report, the author may have performed an internship 
(remunerated or not) in [insert the Company’s name]. This Company may have or have had an interest 
in the covered company or security” and/ or “A draft of the reports have been shown to the covered 
company’s officials (Investors Relations Officer or other), mainly for the purpose of correcting 
inaccuracies, and later modified, prior to its publication.”]  
The content of each report has been shown or made public to restricted parties prior to its publication in 
Nova SBE’s website or in Bloomberg Professional, for academic purposes such as its distribution among 
faculty members for students’ academic evaluation. 
Nova SBE is a state-owned university, mainly financed by state subsidies, students tuition fees and 
companies, through donations, or indirectly by hiring educational programs, among other possibilities. 
Thus, Nova SBE may have received compensation from the target company during the last 12 months, 
related to its fundraising programs, or indirectly through the sale of educational, consulting or research 
services. Nevertheless, no compensation eventually received by Nova SBE is in any way related to or 
dependent on the opinions expressed in this report. The Nova School of Business and Economics does 
not deal for or otherwise offer any investment or intermediation services to market counterparties, private 
or intermediate customers. 
This report may not be reproduced, distributed or published, in whole or in part, without the explicit 
previous consent of its author, unless when used by Nova SBE for academic purposes only. At any time, 
Nova SBE may decide to suspend this report reproduction or distribution without further notice. Neither 
this document nor any copy of it may be taken, transmitted or distributed, directly or indirectly, in any 
country either than Portugal or to any resident outside this country. The dissemination of this document 
other than in Portugal or to Portuguese citizens is therefore prohibited and unlawful. 
A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Master Degree in Finance from the 

















































This report aims to analyze the sifting strategy of Uber, in order to become the 
“operating system of everyday life”. 
The eastern world existing super-apps are analysed, comparing them to Uber. 
Uber’s competition in the west, Facebook, is also taken in 
count. 
Uber is is a good position to ever become a super-app and has already begginig, 










































This work used infrastructure and resources funded by Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia 
(UID/ECO/00124/2013, UID/ECO/00124/2019 and Social Sciences DataLab, Project 22209), POR 
Lisboa (LISBOA-01-0145-FEDER-007722 and Social Sciences DataLab, Project 22209) and POR Norte 
(Social Sciences DataLab, Project 22209).
Introduction 
Uber’s growth strategy used to be to globally replicate what it has done in the US mobility 
market (Forbes 2019). In 2019, the expansion strategy of Uber has shifted. The company 
assumed it wants to be an “operating system for everyday life”, transforming the Uber 
ridesharing app into a utilities super-app (Uber Technologies, Inc. 2019). This would make 
Uber the first supper-app of the western world. In the east, there are several examples of 
super apps, such as GoJek, Grab, LINE, Alipay, Meituan, and WeChat, that were in the past 
mentees of Uber and have become the super-app mentors for Uber. The purpose of this 
research is to understand if Uber has the needed features to pursue and be successful in 
applying this strategy, and also what may be the hindrances the company may find along the 
way. 
The context 
Nowadays, Uber offers services in mainly four segments: ride-sharing, food delivery, freight, 
and bikes and scooters renting. However, the company is already working on the 
diversification it wants to attain in the future. 
In Chicago, the company is testing Uber Work, which connects workers with big and small 
businesses, allowing companies to meet their staffing needs and employees to find a job. In 
Manhattan, Uber is offering helicopter trips to the JFK airport for $ 200 by each trip, and in 
Nigeria, Uber offers boat rides. These are examples of diversification but still in the context 
of mobility or applying the same rationale for jobs. 
In what concerns food delivery, Uber acquired a majority stake in the groceries delivery 
company Cornershop, which operates in Chile, Mexico, Peru and Canada, and it is going to 
expand its business into the US. In San Diego, the company is also testing drone food 
delivery.  
Regarding financial services, Uber launched Uber Money (Uber Technologies, Inc. 2019), 
offering a virtual wallet, credit and debit cards. The company operates in countries where it 
allows payments in cash because financial services are underdeveloped. Particularly in those 
countries, Uber has launched Uber Wallet, a virtual wallet from which people can pay for 
Ubers, reducing cash payments. Now they are launching the virtual wallet in the US, which 
is only available for drivers but will soon launch in Uber’s main app. Credit and debit cards 
are also available just for drivers.   
Rides, food delivery (grocery and meals), e-scooters and bikes, a job platform on tests, and 
an embryonic financial service is what Uber has for now, which is far from the east super 
apps. 
The super-apps operating in the east are mostly followers of Uber’s strategy in mobility with 
the dissimilarity that they have diversified their products, becoming a role model for Uber. 
GoJek launched in Indonesia in 2010 as a motorcycle taxi call center, transformed into an 
app in 2015. Today, it operates in Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, as an app for massages, 
tickets, auto services, beauty services, bill payment, parcel delivery, home maintenance, 
video streaming, laundry, mobile data, repair services, pharmacy services, groceries, food 
delivery, payments, ride-hailing, and banking (GoJek 2019).  
Grab launched in Malaysia in 2012, as GrabTaxi, a taxi-booking mobile app. Now, it offers 
transportation, food delivery, payment services, parcel delivery, tickets, a streaming 
platform, and hotel bookings, in Singapore, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
Philipines, Thailand, and Vietnam (Grab 2019). 
WeChat launched in China in 2011 as an instant messaging app. Today, in China, it is 
possible to use the app to order a taxi, food delivery, as a virtual wallet, and to buy cinema 
tickets.  
Uber vs Facebook 
Uber can become something similar to any of these super apps, but operating in the west.  
On the other hand, Uber is not the only company in this run. Facebook announced at the 
beginning of 2019 that it wants to build a super app, starting from an instant messaging app 
(Facebook 2019). When compared to Uber, Facebook has more users and the characteristic 
of being an app that users consult more often than Uber. 
From the east super-apps, GoJek and Grab started from the rides segment (similar to Uber), 
and WeChat from the social network segment (similar to Facebook). 
Facebook has 2.6 billion users, and the social networks have the engagement advantage. 
People spend much time on Facebook apps (Instagram, Whatsapp, Messenger, and 
Facebook) (Tech Jury 2019). Uber has 100m users, and it is an app that people spend less 
time using. Nevertheless, it is not predictable if people would like to have utilities offers on 
its instant messaging app or would prefer instead to have a separated app for this kind of 
services, remaining the social related apps apart.  
Uber’s main advantage when compared to Facebook is that Uber is already familiarised with 
the business operations such as rides, food delivery, or even payment services, which can be 
replicated for almost all of the super-apps segments, increasing synergies between the 
different offers. The average revenue per user of Uber is $ 31.60 in the second quarter of 
2019, while Facebook has only generated $ 6.40, with 90% coming from advertising. This 
shows that Facebook operations are much more restricted to the network model than Uber. 
Also, Uber has its offers concentrated (or at least associated) to a unique brand name: Uber. 
At Facebook, we have Instagram, Messenger, WhatsApp, and Facebook working as separate 
brands, targeting different types of people, each with their own entity.  
Besides being one solid brand, Uber already changed its services to the main app and 
launched Uber Money for drivers in the US.   
Despite the average time spent on Uber’s app being less than time spent on Facebook apps, 
Uber is in a better position to achieve the super-app statement since they can enjoy costs 
synergies, already operate as a unique brand, and are currently developing services out of the 
mobility sector.  
Beyond competition from Facebook, Uber has the problem of making the new offers 
attractive enough to captivate people. The context where Uber wants to launch new features 
is different from the one where the east super-apps have launched. In the eastern countries, 
the tech world is less developed, and these apps have filled a lack of services that did not 
exist in the west. Most of the offers commonly available in those super-apps already have 
their own app providing that specific service. As so, to be successful, Uber has to make 
people give up on apps like Google Maps, Paypal, Revolut, Netflix, HBO, or Apple Pay. The 
convenience of using just Uber has to be high enough. To overcome this, Uber can enter into 
partnerships with providers of these services or even use subscription offers, as it is already 
doing in the US with the services available nowadays. These subscription services allow 
people to pay a monthly fee to have advantages in the several Uber services, such as zero 
delivery fees or specific discounts.  
Which may also work as an advantage for Uber is the recent acquisition of Careem, from 
which Uber can take lessons related to its diversified offers and apply it in different markets. 
Conclusion 
Having in mind the success of the past launches of Uber, the company is in a favorable 
position to ever be a super-app.  The company has an adequate scale and the experience of 
launching innovative services around the world, comparing to Facebook. Also, in 2010, Uber 
was just a ride-sharing, and now it already offers food and grocery delivery, financial 
services, freight services, e-scooters and bike renting, traffic information, job finding, 
helicopter, and boat rides. The company has become the immediate answer when talking 
about mobility, with people saying “Let’s Uber there”, in 63 countries all over the world. 
Having accomplished this, being a super app might be the challenge designed for Uber.  
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